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CPLR 5239: Prior perfected U.C.C. security interest superior to
judgment lien.

CPLR 5239 provides that an interested person may bring
a special proceeding to determine his rights in property which
has been levied upon prior to its disposition by the sheriff. In
such a proceeding the court may vacate the levy, or, if there
appear to be disputed issues of fact, the court will order a
separate trial and indicate who is to 20have possession of the
property in question pending a decision.1
2
Petitioner in William Iselin & Co. v. Burgess & Leigh Ltd.1 1
held a perfected security interest in the debtor's present and afteracquired inventory and accounts receivable. The financing agreement gave petitioner the right to foreclose upon default or nonpayment. Subsequently, one of the respondents obtained a judgment
against the debtor, execution was issued to the sheriff and the
debtor's inventory was levied upon. Petitioner thereafter demanded
payments due under the financing agreement and the debtor
defaulted.
Petitioner brought a special proceeding, pursuant to CPLR
5239, to have respondent's levy vacated. The respondent contended that petitioner's agreement with the debtor, whereby
petitioner refrained from declaring the debtor in default so he
might continue to operate the business and deplete his inventory,
created a material issue of fact as to right of possession, and
sought a continuance or a denial of petitioner's motion, pending
discovery proceedings pursuant to CPLR 3212(f) .122 In vacating
the levy, the. court held that the petitioner had the right to take
possession of the inventory by virtue of the express provision of
the financing agreement and Uniform Commercial Code Section
9-503 123 The court reasoned that, upon filing, 24 petitioner's
security interest took priority over all unfiled and unperfected
interests125 including respondent's since a judgment creditor's
lien, pursuant to CPLR 5202(a), is perfected only by the issuance
of execution. Petitioner's prior right, gained by duly filing the
120See 7B McKiNNEY's CPLR 5239, commentary 201 (1963).
121 52 Misc. 2d 821, 276 N.Y.S.2d 659 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1967).
122CPLR 3212(f)

provides that where it appears "from affidavits sub-

mitted in opposition to the motion that facts essential to justify opposition

may exist but cannot then be stated, the court may deny the motion or
may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or disclosure

to be had and may make such other order as may be just."
123 Uniform Commercial Code § 9-503 provides that on default, a secured
party, unless otherwise agreed, has the right to possession of the collateral

and may take possession without judicial process if that can be done without12a breach of the peace.
4N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-302.
125 N.Y. U.C.C. §§ 9-301, 9-312.
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financing statement, was a matter of public record and discovery
proceedings were, therefore, unnecessary.
Since the right of
possession was in the petitioner, and not in the debtor, the levy
26
by respondent was ineffective to transfer the right of possession.
The decision in Iselin illustrates with clarity the all-pervasive
character of U.C.C. liens and, to a certain extent, establishes not
only the priorities that will result when conflict with the rights
of a judgment creditor arises, but also that CPLR 5239 is the
27
medium through which such priority disputes are to be resolved.1
ARTICLE 63 -

INJUNCTION

CPLR 6301.: Injunction inay be granted in special proceeding.
In City Commission on Human Rights v. Regal Gardens,
Inc., s8 by order to show cause, petitioner, alleging discrimination,
sought a preliminary' 2 injunction pursuant to CPLR 6301 to
restrain respondents from renting or otherwise disposing of a
certain apartment.
Before addressing itself to the merits of the complaint, the
court had to remove one technical hurdle argued by the respondents,
viz., that the court could not entertain the application since it
was not made in a pending action. 3
In answering this contention, the court pointed out that Section B1-8.0(4) of the Administrative Code of the City of New York authorizes the use of a
show cause order under the facts of the present case as a
"prosecution in the form of a special proceeding." '3'
The court
also cited CPLR 103(c) which directs that, when the parties
are before the court, it should not dismiss solely because the
proceeding "is not brought in the proper form, but the court shall
make whatever order is required for its proper prosecution."
However, the injunction was denied because the Commission had
no knowledge of the merits of the complaint and the only basis of
the charge of discrimination was a hearsay statement by the
complainant.
120 William Iselin & Co. v. Burgess & Leigh Ltd., 52 Misc. 2d 821,
2762 N.Y.S.2d 659 (Sup. Ct N.Y. County 1967).

1 7 See 7B McKNNEY's CPLR 5239, supp. commentary 86 (1967).
128 53 Misc. 2d 318, 278 N.Y.S.2d 739 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1967).
1297B McKImNxE's CPLR 6301, commentary 127 (1963).
Note the

difference between preliminary injunction (with notice) and temporary
restraining order (without notice).
230 CPLR 6301 makes the remedy of preliminary injunction available
"in any action . . . !'
31 CPLR 103(b) provides that "[a]ll civil judicial proceedings shall be

prosecuted in the form of an action, except where prosecution in the form
of a special proceeding is authorized" (emphasis added).

